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Case Comment
Allegations of Criminal Conduct: Application of the
Fact-Opinion Dichotomy in Defamation Actions
I. INTRODUCTION
The freedoms of speech and press are two fundamental rights guaranteed by the
first amendment of the United States Constitution.' These constitutional interests,
which protect the free flow of information, must be balanced against the competing
concern for a person's reputation in defamation 2 cases. 3 After the plaintiff in a libel
suit proves actual injury to his reputation, a constitutional question of law is raised:
Is the statement permissible opinion that is completely protected by the first
amendment, or is it a potentially defamatory fact?4 Courts have had considerable
difficulty applying this fact-opinion distinction, particularly when accusations of
criminal behavior are involved. 5 Because charges of illegal activity are "blatantly
injurious" to reputations, 6 courts must actively prevent the unnecessary subordina-
tion of a person's reputational interest to the media's first amendment interests.
Therefore, the circumstances surrounding false imputations of illegal behavior must
be carefully considered and properly balanced when determining whether the
statement is fact or opinion.
1. See U.S. Co.sr. amend. I. See also J. NowAX, R. RoUtNDA & J.N. YOuNG, CoNsrrnmoNAI LAw 830-37 (3d ed.
1986).
2. Defamation may be defined as the unprivileged publication of false communications that naturally and
proximately result in an invasion of an individual's right to personal security in reputation and good name. See generally
RFsTATEmENr (Secom) oF Toam § 559 (1977) ("A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."); W. NssE, W. uzmoN, D. DOBBS, R. KEEmTN & D. OwEN, Tus LAw or Tom 771, 773 (5th ed. 1984) (Defamation
is "an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name, through communication to others which tends . . . to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or
unpleasant feelings or opinions against him."). Defamation law is comprised of the torts of libel and slander. Libel is the
"publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form
of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words." RFsTrsmNr
(SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 568(l) (1977). Slander is the "publication by defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures
or by any form of communication other than those in Subsection (1)." Id. § 568(2).
3. See L. ELDBEnC, THE LAw or DE.,Am-nox 1, 2 (1978). See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)
("Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. But in cases like the
present, there is tension between this interest and the values nurtured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.");
McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 841 (st Cir. 1987).
4. See B. SAToRO, LImEL AND PtuvAcy: THE PBEvENTon AND D.mnE OF LmnaATioN 107 (1985). See also infra notes
17-48 and accompanying text.
5. See SA RDii, supra note 4, at 107 ("[No area of modem libel law can be murkier than the cavernous depths
of this [fact-opinion] inquiry."); see also infra notes 49-102 and accompanying text.
6. See Saenz v. Playboy Enters., 653 F. Supp. 552, 566-67 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("That a piece is easily identifiable
as a work of political criticism and opinion does not, of course, give the writer license to make whopping factual
misstatements blantantly injurious to reputations."). See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (noting that reputation has been fairly described as part of "the essential dignity and worth of every human
being"); Raymer v. Doubleday & Co., 615 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Privitera v. Town
of Phelps, 79 A.D.2d 1,435 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1981).
294 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:293
In Scott v. News-Herald7 the Ohio Supreme Court applied a fact-opinion test to
an accusation of illegal activity. 8 The case adopted a "totality of circumstances" test
in order to distinguish fact from opinion.9 The court held that the article, which
accused a public official of perjury, was nonactionable opinion warranting unquali-
fied first amendment protection.' 0 The Scott majority improperly applied the
fact-opinion test and essentially suppressed the rights of the plaintiff in favor of media
interests.
Without an accurate assessment of the competing concerns, the goal of the first
amendment-achieving the fullest development of man's intellect and spirit-will
not be realized.II This Case Comment contends that the personal reputational interest
of a public figure or public official must be protected in a libel suit by applying a
presumption to totality of circumstances analyis: Specific charges of criminal conduct
are so inherently factual that these statements cannot be considered opinion unless no
reasonable reader would believe the publication was accusing the plaintiff of
committing a crime. After a review of the major decisions contributing to the
development of the fact-opinion doctrine,12 this Case Comment will briefly examine
the standards used in libel actions concerning allegations of criminal misconduct.13
Next, the development of Ohio law leading to the Scott decision will be discussed. 14
In addition, this Case Comment will discuss the Scott case and question the Scott
court's fact-opinion analysis. 15 In addition, this Case Comment will provide an
appropriate application of the totality of circumstances test to defamation actions that
concern assertions of criminal conduct.16 These guidelines will properly safeguard an
individual's reputational interest without inhibiting the public dissemination of
information.
II. THE FACr-OPNON DocRiNE iN PERSPECnvE
A. The Foundation of the Fact-Opinion Dichotomy
At common law, fair comment and criticism upon matters of legitimate public
interest constituted a defense in defamation actions. 17 In order to invoke the fair
comment privilege, most jurisdictions required the defendant to establish initially that
the allegedly libelous statement was merely protected opinion and did not constitute
7. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
8. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
9. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986).
10. Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709.
11. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Note, Content Regulation and
the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARv. L. Ray. 1854 (1983).
12. See infra notes 17-80 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 81-102 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 124-237 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
17. Generally, the fair comment defense required the defendant to establish the following: 1) the truth of the facts
upon which the writer commented; 2) the fairness of the opinion; and 3) the public interest in the matter. See W. PsossER,
HANDBOOK F iaE LAw OF Toms 820 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Developments in the Law: Defamation, 69 -ARv. L. R v. 875,
925-28 (1956); REsTATEmNT OFTORTS § 606 (1938).
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a factual assertion. 18 Statements based on falsely stated facts were not considered
opinions that were protected by the fair comment privilege. Furthermore, if the
statement implied the existence of unstated defamatory facts not generally known, the
fair comment defense was not permitted.19 These rules were justified on the grounds
that an ordinary reader would understand the statements to be existing fact,
effectively preventing the person from forming an unbiased conclusion. 20 "In so far
as facts are assumed as the basis of the criticism, or untrue allegations of fact are
introduced... [the statement] does not answer to the description of comment, and
is defamation, pure and simple." '2'
The constitutional privilege for opinion, which was established in the landmark
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,22 has extinguished the media's need for the
fair comment defense in cases concerning public figures. 23 Justice Brennan, writing
for a unanimous court in Sullivan, determined the applicable standard to be applied
18. Most courts refused to apply the fair comment privilege to false statements of fact. Thus, the distinction
between fact and opinion became crucially important; the defendant's failure to convince the court that the statement
constituted opinion would preclude jury consideration of the fair comment defense. Truth was the only defense remaining.
See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); Kirkland v. Constitution Publishing Co., 38 Ga.
App. 632, 144 S.E. 821 (1928), affd, 169 Ga. 264, 149 S.E. 869 (1929); Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327
Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (1945); Smith v. Pure Oil Co., 278 Ky. 430, 128 S.W.2d 931 (1939); Bander v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N.E.2d 595 (1943);Eikhoffv. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353,361, 83N.W. 110,
113 (1900); Van Arsdale v. Time, Inc., 35 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 265 A.D. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 413
(1942). See also Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense: An Alternative to "Actual
Malice," 30 DE PAuL L. REv. 1, 11 (1980); W. HRtx, Tr LAw oF Tim Ppxss § 15, at 103 (3d ed. 1948); Veeder, Freedom
of Public Discussion, 23 HARv. L. Rsv. 413, 419-22 (1910); Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A
Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. Rv. 1203, 1203-05 (1962); REsTATErmNT (SEcoND) OF Toms § 566
comment a (1977).
Prior to Sullivan, the minority rule held that comment was privileged even if the statement was founded upon an
inaccurate or incomplete recitation of the facts. Thus, misstatements of fact concerning public officers or candidates for
public office were protected if made for public benefit with an honest belief in their truth. See PRossER, supra note 17, at
819-20 nn.6-8. Although the qualified privilege may have discouraged worthy candidates from entering the political
arena, these courts reasoned that this harm was outweighed by the public benefit of free access to information. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964). See also Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281
(1908); R. SAcK, LiBE, Stvme, AND RE.aE PaoS s 167 (1980).
19. See F. HAwpmE & F. Jxmis, THE LAw oF TORTS 458-60 (1956); RF=rATEmEN (SEcNn) OF Toms § 566 comment a
(1977).
20. See id. See also Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83 N.W. 110 (1900).
21. Veeder, supra note 18, at 424, quoted in HARvu & Jk'.s, supra note 19, at 460. See also Eikhoff v. Gilbert,
124 Mich. 353, 83 N.W. 110 (1900). A circular accused an incumbent politician of "champion[ing] measures opposed
to the moral interests of the community." The unstated reference related to the candidate's endorsement of antitemperance
legislation. The fair comment privilege did not apply because the readers could only speculate as to the underlying facts
supporting the conclusion. Id. at 354-61, 83 N.W. at 111-13.
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Most states held that a person who published a false and defamatory statement without reasonable grounds for
believing it to be true could not rely on the fair comment privilege. See ELuoEG, supra note 3, at 451; REsrATErNEr OF
ToRTS § 601 (1938). Hence, the proof required to establish the plaintiffs cause of action (reckless disregard of the truth
for plaintiffs who are public officals or public figures) would always eliminate any fair comment defense. See ELDREDGE,
supra note 3, at 451. See also infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
Some courts have suggested that the common-law doctrine of fair comment has been obviated by the Supreme
Court's constitutionalization of broader, stronger first amendment defenses. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
975 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) ("Although [the] claim arises under the District of
Columbia common law of libel, . . . the issue whether the allegedly libelous statements are protected opinion is to be
decided as a matter of federal constitutional law." (citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1983)).
See also Yerkle v. Post-Newsweek Stations, 470 F. Supp. 91, 94 (D. Md. 1979); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433
F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd without opinion, 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bucher v. Roberts, 198 Colo.
1,595 P.2d 239 (1979); Naked City, Inc. v. Chicago Sun-Times, 77 M. App. 3d 188, 395 N.E.2d 1042 (1979); Mashbum
v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 891 (La. 1977).
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to defamation actions brought by public officials when there is "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open .... ",24 In order to encourage unrestrained debate on matters
of public importance, the Court held that under the first and fourteenth amendments
a qualified privilege must apply to both statements of fact and opinion. 25 Hence, any
distinction between fact and opinion seemed to be irrelevant in applying a qualified
first amendment privilege to statements about public officials. Defamatory falsehoods
concerning a matter of public importance were permissible when made without actual
malice. 26 In other words, a newspaper would be liable in a defamation action only if
it published a statement relating to official conduct with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth. 27
The fact-opinion distinction reemerged with new significance in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.28 The Supreme Court held that a private person does not have to prove
that the defendant published the statement with actual malice in order to recover in
a libel action.2 9 Gertz permitted the states to impose any standard of care other than
strict liability whenever private individuals were involved.3 0 Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, also elaborated on the fact-opinion distinction:
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
25. Id. at 279-80. Any statement of fact or opinion protected by the fair comment defense was privileged if made
without actual malice. Sullivan essentially elevated the fair comment doctrine to a constitutional privilege: "Since the
Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of fact, it follows that
a defense of fair comment must be afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true,
statements of fact." Id. at 292 n.30. Thus, protected comments needed to address an issue of public interest and be made
with a good faith belief as to their truth. See supra note 18.
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
27. Id.
28. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The case was indirectly related to the death of a Chicago youth. The boy's family retained
attorney Robert Gertz to initiate a civil suit against Richard Nuccio, a policeman later convicted for murdering the youth.
American Opinion, the John Birch Society's monthly magazine, published an article accusing Gertz of framing the
Chicago policeman, of having a criminal record, and of maintaining communist sympathies. The United States District
Court held that Gertz, a private citizen, must show actual malice as required by Sullivan. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision, and Gertz appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 325-32.
29. Id. at 347. A public official must prove that defamatory comments relating to matters of public concern were
made with actual malice. This standard applies to public figures as well. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967). In contrast, defamatory remarks concerning a private-figure plaintiff and a matter of private concern are
redressable absent a showing of actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
However, a private-figure plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity when the media defendant's speech concerns a matter
of public interest. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,777 (1986). Because a public official or figure
is required to prove actual malice-whether the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not--these plaintiffs arguably have the burden of proving falsity. Id. (The Hepps Court
noted in dictum that one might expect a public-figure plaintiff to show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to
prevail on a suit for defamation in light of Sullivan.). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86
(1964); Note, Structuring Defamation Law to Eliminate the Fact-Opinion Determination: A Critique of Oilman v. Evans,
71 IowA L. Ray. 913, 932 n.172 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Structuring Defamation Law]. Proof of actual malice would
not make sense "if the statement was in fact true or could not be characterized as being either true or false." Franklin
& Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARv L. REv. 825, 855 (1984).
However, the issue has not been conclusively addressed by the Supreme Court. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 788 n. 10 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If the issue were properly before us, I would be inclined
to the view that public figures should not bear the burden of disproving the veracity of accusations made against them with
'actual malice,' as the New York Times Court used that term.... mhe constitutional value in truthful statements...
[does not require] any more protection of defamatory utterances whose truth may not be ascertained than is provided by
the New York Times test.").
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
Fact-Opinion Dichotomy in Defamation Actions
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest
in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.31
Hence, no matter how opprobrious or unreasonable an expression of pure opinion
may appear, it is not actionable. The expression of ideas, unlike false statements of
fact, receives unqualified constitutional protection. 32 Courts have interpreted this
dictum as "a bright line demarcating when defamation law must give way to the
mandates of the first amendment. 3 The dichotomy, however, has not been easily
distinguished.34 Thus, courts have turned to two Supreme Court cases for guidance.
The Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler35 decision con-
cerned a newspaper article that described a public city council meeting in which it
was correctly stated that some people characterized the plaintiff developer's negoti-
ating position as "blackmail. ' 3 6 The Court found that publication of the word was
not defamatory in light of the heated debate and the complete, accurate report of the
plaintiff's proposal.3 7 However, the Court implied that the use of the word
"blackmail" could constitute libel if the statement was a false accusation of criminal
extortion rather than rhetorical hyperbole. 38 Courts have interpreted this case to mean
that statements must be examined in the context of the article in which they appear. 39
The second Supreme Court decision, Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National
Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin,4° relied on the Gertz dictum. 4 1 The case
concerned a union newsletter that defined a "scab" as a "traitor to his God, his
country, his family, and his class.' 42 The Court held that this language was not fact,
reasoning that the statement was made in "a loose, figurative sense" to emphasize
the opposition to anti-unionization views.43 The Court concluded that "[e]xpression
of such opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under federal labor
31. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Presumably, Justice Powell was considering statements of "pure" opinion. These comments are accompanied by a
statement of facts upon which they are based. On the other hand, a statement of "mixed" opinion implies a factual
justification unknown to its receivers. "To say of a person that he is a thief, without explaining why, may, depending
upon the circumstances, be found to imply the assertion that he has committed acts that come within the common
connotation of thievery." RrsrArsanusr (Seco.\M) OF TORTS § 566 comment b (1977).
32. "Unconditional" or "unqualified" first amendment protection is reserved for statements of opinion.
"Conditional" or "qualified" privilege is afforded to statements that are characterized as factual. Thus, expressions of
fact concerning public officials are not protected when made with actual malice. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. See McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 841 (1st Cir. 1987).
34. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
35. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 14 & n.7 ("No reader could have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles
reporting their words were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal offense.").
39. See, e.g., McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1987).
40. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
41. Id. at 284.
42. Id. at 268.
43. Id. at 284.
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law."44 This case is important precedent because it expands the significance of the
context in which the statement was expressed.45
The Greenbelt-Gertz-Letter Carriers trilogy stands for the proposition that
expressions of opinion are protected by the first amendment in defamation actions
and, therefore, the distinction between fact and opinion is necessary.4 6 The question
of whether a particular statement should be classified as a nonactionable opinion or
an actionable fact has been answered differently by the courts. 47 However, a number
of courts have indicated that these Supreme Court decisions imply that allegations of
criminal conduct warrant special consideration. 48
B. Current Interpretations of the Fact-Opinion Distinction
Virtually all state and federal courts have interpreted the Gertz "no false
opinion" dictum to have elevated the distinction between fact and opinion to
constitutional principle.4 9 However, the Supreme Court precedents have not outlined
a definitive test for distinguishing between fact and opinion, and the Court has
provided little guidance on the proper method of balancing a statement that has
elements of both fact and opinion. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that
differentiating between fact and opinion remains an important consideration in libel
law today.5 0 Not surprisingly, the problem has spawned a variety of interpretations. 5'
44. Id.
45. See McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842 (lst Cir. 1987).
46. See SAmroRo, supra note 4, at 112.
47. See infra notes 51-52. See also Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need
for a Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817 (1984) [hereinafter Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction]; Note, Fact and
Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 Ruroess L. REv. 81 (1981) [hereinafter
Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz).
48. See infra notes 88 and 94 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The
constitutional distinction between fact and opinion is now firmly established in the case law of the circuits."); McCabe
v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 841 (Ist Cir. 1987); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985) ("Gertz's implicit command thus imposes upon both state and federal courts the duty as a matter of
constitutional adjudication to distinguish facts from opinions .... ").
50. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). The now Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[lit is apparent from the cases cited by petitioner that lower courts have seized upon the word "opinion" in the
second sentence [of the Gertz dictum] to solve with a meat axe a very subtle and difficult question, totally
oblivious "of the rich and complex history of the struggle of the common law to deal with this problem."
Id. at 1129 (quoting Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Cotms. L. Rev. 1205, 1239 (1976)).
Moreover, the fact-opinion distinction has been criticized by many commentators as being more "announced than
defined." See Note, Fair Comment, 62 Hwv. L. REv. 1207, 1212 (1949). See also Carman, supra note 18, at 12; 7
J. Wiomom, EvinEscE § 1919 (Chadbourn rev. 1978); Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction, supra note 47; 1 HARma &
JAiss, supra note 19, at 458; Note, Structuring Defamation Law, supra note 29; PeossER, supra note 17, at 820; SAcK,
supra note 18, at 155; Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 Tax. L. Rev. 41, 53 (1929); Titus, supra note 18, at 1221.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to cite the distinction favorably. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). The case concemed a critical review of Bose loudspeakers in Consumer
Reports. After citing the Gertz fact-opinion dictum, the Court noted that the statements at issue "tread the line between
fact and opinion." Although the Court did not specifically characterize the article as opinion, Justice Stevens explained
that the critique "represents the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to which the New
York Times rule applies." Id. at 514, 513. See also Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180, 4181 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1988) (No. 86-1278) ("False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking
function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired
by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.").
51. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 977-78 & nn.12-13 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
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1. The Totality of Circumstances Test
Recently, many courts have adopted the "totality of circumstances" test that
was outlined by Judge Starr of the D.C. Circuit in Ollman v. Evans.52 The case
stemmed from a syndicated newspaper column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
that questioned the nomination of Bertell Olman, an avowed Marxist professor, to
chair the University of Maryland's Department of Politics and Government.5 3 Ollman
contended that several of the statements and innuendos concerning his reputation
were defamatory. These remarks suggested that he was more a political activist intent
on converting students to Marxism than a scholar respected in his profession. 54 Evans
and Novak refused Ollman's request for a retraction. After Olman was denied the
chairmanship, he filed suit against the journalists. 55
Olman contended that the allegedly false and defamatory statements resulted in
his loss of the chairmanship, damaged his reputation as a scholar, and caused him
(1985). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a totality of circumstances test in Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One
Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980). The three part test holds that statements which" . . . convey pertinent
information to the public about a matter of public interest . . are made in the course of public debate or similar
circumstances, and .. . are phrased in cautionary language" are opinion. See Murray v. Bailey, 613 F. Supp. 1276,
1282 (N.D. Cal. 1985). See also Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1987); Keller
v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711 (1lth Cir. 1985); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408
(C.D. Cal. 1987); Ault v. Hustler, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2232 (D. Or. 1987); King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 12
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2361 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986), affd inpart, rev'd inpart, 400 Mass. 705,512 N.E.2d 241 (1987);
Aldoupolis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 398 Mass. 731, 500 N.E.2d 794 (1986).
The Fast Circuit has recently adopted another totality of circumstances test to distinguish fact from opinion that
examines the following: I) the statement itself; 2) the article as a whole; and 3) the social context. McCabe v. Rattiner,
814 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1987). See also Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463 (D.N.H. 1987); Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1238 (D.R.I. 1987).
A number of courts rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts to distinguish fact from opinion. An expression is
actionable if it implies undisclosed defamatory facts because a reader would not be able to assess independently the
reasonableness of the statement. REsrATEaNr (SEcoND) OF ToRs § 566 & comments (1977). See, e.g., Koch v. Goldway,
817 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1987); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1115 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960
(1979); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Bums v.
McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1983); O'Donnell v. Field Enter., Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d 1032,
491 N.E.2d 1212 (1986); Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp., 127 N.H. 214, 498 A.2d 348 (1985); Kamell v. Campbell,
206 N.J. Super. 81,501 A.2d 1029 (1985); Chalpin v. Amordian Press, 128 A.D.2d 81,515 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1987); Healey
v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 520 A.2d 147 (R.I. 1987).
52. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The Oilman test has been adopted in a
number ofjurisdictions. See Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987); Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987); Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480
(7th Cir. 1986); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986); Mr.
Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985); Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., No.
87-0455-R, slip op. (E.D. Va. Dec. 28, 1987) (LEXIS, Federal library, Omni file); Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669
F. Supp. 356 (D. Colo. 1987); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987); Saenz v. Playboy
Enters., 653 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Il. 1987); Liberty Lobby v. Dow Jones Co., 638 F. Supp. 1149 (D.D.C. 1986); Karp
v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn.
1985); Riley v. Moyed, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1420 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 529 A.2d 248 (Del. 1986); Yancey
v. Hamilton, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1319 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1987); Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc); Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986); Brasher v. Carr, No. C14-86-753-CV, slip
op. (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Texas file); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797
(rex. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987). See also Note, The Fact Opinion Dilemma in First
Amendment Defamation Law, 13 Wm. Mrrnix L. Rv. 545 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The Fact-Opinion Dilemma]; Note,
Structuring Defamation Lav, supra note 29; Note, Defamation-Actionable Statement of Fact Versus Privileged Opinion:
Oilman v. Evans, 34 U. KAS. L. REv. 367 (1985).
53. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 971-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
54. Id. at 972-73.
55. Id. at 973.
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mental anguish.5 6 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia5 7
entered summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the entire article was
constitutionally protected opinion, including a quote from an anonymous colleague
that the professor had "no status" among his peers in his discipline.5 8 In a per curiam
opinion, a three-judge panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.5 9 Two months
later, however, the court of appeals voted to vacate this decision and rehear the case
en banc. In early 1985 the court affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary
judgment for the defendants in a six to five decision. 6° The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 6'
Reflecting the difficulty in distinguishing statements of fact from statements of
opinion, nine justices on the court of appeals wrote separate opinions. However, eight
justices interpreted the Gertz dictum to mandate the fact-opinion distinction, and they
generally agreed with Judge Starr's test. 62 This totality of circumstances test has the
following four branches: 1) whether the common usage and meaning of the allegedly
defamatory statements have a precise meaning that gives rise to factual implications;
2) whether the statement is capable of objective verification; 3) whether the general
linguistic context of the statement transforms an ostensibly factual statement into
opinion; and 4) whether the broader social context in which the statement appears
indicates the statement is opinion. 63
56. Oilman v. Evans, 479 F. Supp. 292, 292 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 294.
59. Oilman v. Evans, 713 F.2d 838, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), vacated, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
60. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 970-71 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
61. Oilman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
62. Judge Starr, joined by Judge Tamm, wrote the majority opinion. Judge Bork, concurring in the result but
outlining additional considerations, was joined by Judges Wilkey, Ginsburg, and Senior Circuit Judge MacKinnon.
Dissenting in part was Chief Judge Robinson and Judges Wright, Wald, Edwards, and Scalia. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
63. Id. at 979. Note that Judge Starr rejected the "undisclosed facts" rationale promulgated by the Restatement
because it is unnecessary if the four-factor analysis is employed properly:
The definiteness and verifiability of a statement (factors one and two) clearly bear on the ability of a statement
to earry factual implications. The linguistic and social context of the statement (factors three and four) will also
influence the average reader's readiness to infer from the statement the existence of undisclosed facts. Thus,
once our inquiry into whether the statement is fact or expression of opinion has concluded, the factors militating
either in favor of or against the drawing of factual implications have already been identified. A separate inquiry
into whether a statement, already classified in this painstaking way as opinion, implies allegedly defamatory
facts, would, in our view, be superfluous.
Id. at 985.
Nevertheless, a number of courts consider Restatement § 566 in conjunction with the totality of circumstances tests.
See, e.g., Kelly v. Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986); Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711 (1 th
Cir. 1985); Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985); Price v. Viking Press, Inc.,
625 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1985); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr.
206 (1986); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987);
Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1986); Note, The Fact-Opinion Dilemma, supra note 52.
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2. The Public, Political Controversy Component
In his concurring opinion in Ollman, Judge Bork rejected the "rigid" four factor
test and adopted a balancing approach. 64 Part of this balancing inquiry focuses on
weighing the particular first amendment concerns implicated by the case, that is,
whether the plaintiff had entered the public, political arena. According to Judge Bork,
a reader would expect a statement made in the heated debate of a political controversy
to be more hyperbolic than factual.65 Moreover, persons in the political arena should
expect this criticism. Thus, the first amendment should protect these statements. 66
The public, political arena principle is closely related to the fourth prong of the
totality of circumstances test.67 Courts that have adopted Judge Starr's analysis
sometimes incorporate the public, political context analysis when examining the
broad social setting in which the statement appeared.68 The Eighth Circuit adopted
this approach in Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc.69 The case stemmed from a defamation
action brought by Governor William Janklow of South Dakota against Newsweek
magazine. The publication reported that eight months after the then Attorney General
Janklow had been charged with assault, he "was prosecuting" the party who brought
the charge for an unrelated crime. 70
Using the totality of circumstances test, the Janklow court concluded that the
statement was opinion.7 1 Judge Arnold, writing for the majority, began the analysis
by emphasizing that no single factor is dispositive and that the ultimate resolution of
the fact-opinion question must be founded upon consideration of all the circum-
stances. 72 The court found that the imputation of vengeance was not a precise or
verifiable accusation of criminal malfeasance in office.73 Moreover, the literary con-
text of the statement would have signaled the reader to expect some opinion despite
its placement in a hard news section of Newsweek.74 Last, the court incorporated Judge
Bork's concept of a "public, political arena" into the fourth prong of the test as
elucidated by Judge Starr. 75 The majority noted that this "public context" would
determine whether the statement involved "core values of the First Amendment.' '76
64. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
65. Id. at 1002 (Bork, J., concurring).
66. Id. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Judge Bork's
analysis follows the Supreme Court's concern for the "forum of robust debate" when analyzing the fact-opinion
determination. Id. at 513.
67. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (MacKinnon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986); Henry
v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1985) (en bane).
69. 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986). See also Note, Will Words Never Hurt?-
Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 19 CeecaerroN L. REv. 1015 (1986); Note, Confision Persists in the Distinction Betveen Fact
and Opinion in Defamation Actions, 54 UMKC L. REv. 704 (1986).
70. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986).
71. Id. at 1302-05.
72. Id. at 1302.
73. Id. at 1303-04.
74. Id. at 1304.
75. Id. at 1303.
76. Id.
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Consequently, the Janklow court concluded that the free flow of information
about the government and its officers implicates core first amendment values. 77
Furthermore, the court noted that it is "vital to our form of government that press and
citizens alike be free to discuss, and if they see fit, impugn the motives of public
officials." ' 78 Because the statement at issue merely criticized the motives and
intentions of a prominent government official relating to an issue of public interest,
the first amendment implications inherent in the public, political arena indicated that
the statement was constitutionally protected opinion. 79 In conclusion, however, the
court was careful to note that the concept of actionable fact would have been
particularly applicable to accusations of actual criminal conduct against public
officials. 80
3. The Criminal Conduct Distinction
The current interpretation of the first amendment permits newspapers to
comment freely on the actions of government, public figures, and other public
persons. However, a number of courts recognize the potentially serious damage and
vindictive consequences arising from an accusation of criminal conduct and give
these statements special consideration in defamation actions.81 In these jurisdictions,
defamatory falsehoods that manifestly impute illegal behavior do not warrant
unqualified first amendment protection given to statements of opinion; instead, direct
assertions of illegal activity are treated by these courts as inherently factual
statements.8 2 Thus, these factual accusations of criminal conduct are afforded the
qualified protection of the Sullivan actual malice test when they concern public
figures or officials and always must be proven false.8 3
The special treatment given to criminal conduct allegations stems from the
concept of slander per se.84 The common-law rule maintains that:
One who publishes a slander which imputes to the plaintiff the commission of a crime
which if committed at the place of publication would be (1) punishable by death or
77. Id. at 1304.
78. Id. at 1305.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1305 n.6.
81. See infra notes 88, 94. See also Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz, supra note 47, at 114-16.
82. See infra notes 88, 94.
83. See supra note 29.
84. Words deemed defamatory without proof of special damages are deemed slanderous per se. Slander per se
consists of the following four classifications: 1) words imputing a criminal offense; 2) words imputing certain diseases;
3) words imputing a woman's unchastity; and 4) words disparaging a person in his business, trade, profession, or office.
See generally ELDREDGo, supra note 3, at 94-150.
Published statements that have defamatory meaning on the face of the communication are libelous per se. No
pleading or proof of special damages is necessary. The cause of action only requires the plaintiff to prove that the libel
concerned him and that he has suffered "actual injury" as defined in Gertz. On the other hand, a statement that is
defamatory only in light of extrinsic facts known by the recipient is called libel per quod, and it may be actionable only
with the proof of special damages. See ELDsEGo, supra note 3, at 93-94; SAcK, supra note 18, at 97. See also Shifflet
v. Thomson Newspapers, 69 Ohio St. 2d 179, 431 N.E.2d 1014 (1982). Many jurisdictions maintain the distinction
despite the Restatement's position that the distinction is obsolete. See RFsrATEmNr (SEcoND) or Tom § 569 comment b
(1977).
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imprisonment in a state or federal institution, or (2) regarded by public opinion as involving
moral turpitude, is subject to liability without proof of special harm.8 5
For example, a false imputation of perjury, which is clearly understood as a criminal
accusation by the average person in light of all the surrounding circumstances, would
constitute slander per se.86 The rationale for making imputations of criminal conduct
slanderous per se is that these charges are manifestly damaging statements which
"expose the plaintiff to obloquy and social criticism." 8 7
State courts have distinguished criminal conduct accusations from other defama-
tory statements. 8 8 In 1977 the highest court of New York recognized the particularly
85. EuDRE, supra note 3, at 99.
An allegation of illegal behavior is slanderous per se under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 571 (1977) if the crime
involves moral turpitude or is punishable in the first instance by confinement. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc.,
626 F. Supp. 865 (D.N.H. 1985); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 533 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Korry v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Dorr v. C.B. Johnson, Inc., 660 P.2d 517 (Colo.
App. 1983); Danahy v. Meese, 84 A.D.2d 670, 446 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1981); Wecht v. PG Publishing Co., 353 Pa. Super.
493, 510 A.2d 769 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 632, 522 A.2d 559 (1987); Gulf Ad. Life Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 696
S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985); Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846 (1985); Starobin
v. Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 287 N.W.2d 747 (1980); Converters Equip. Corp. v. Condes Corp., 80 Wis.
2d 257, 258 N.W.2d 712 (1977).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 (1977), which addresses libelous criminal accusations, is even broader than
section 571:
[lI]f the imputation of crime is defamatory as described in § 559 [Defamatory Communication Defined], it is
immaterial that the crime charged does not involve moral turpitude or that it is not punishable by imprisonment.
It is enough that the crime is of a character such as to harm the reputation of the person charged with it in the
eyes of a substantial minority of respectable persons.
See, e.g., Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc.,
626 F. Supp. 865 (D.N.H. 1985); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 533 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Fram v. Yellow
Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, 380 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Hogan v. New York Times Co., 211 F. Supp. 99 (D. Conn.
1962), affd, 313 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1963); Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978); Proto v. Bridgeport Herald
Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 72 A.2d 820 (1950); Pollitt v. Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 214 Md. 570, 136 A.2d 573
(1957); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987); Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 295,483
A.2d 456 (1984); Wilson v. Benjamin, 332 Pa. Super. 211, 481 A.2d 328 (1984); Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, 446 Pa.
266, 285 A.2d 166 (1971); Ward v. Painters' Local Union No. 300, 41 Wash. 2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953).
86. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). Justice Day quoted with approval from NEwum. o N
DErA.uAmno., LrEL .A SLAoR § 163, at 556-57 (1890): "The publisher must add nothing of his own [when giving an
account of judicial proceedings]. He must not state his opinion of the conduct of the parties, or impute motives therefor
he must not insinuate that a particular witness committed petjury." Id. at 152. See also Sivelle v. Maloof, 373 F.2d 520
(1st Cir. 1967); Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962); Owner's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ott, 402 So. 2d
466 (Fla. App. 1981); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Riley, 294 So. 2d 59 (Fla. App. 1974); Atlanta News Publishing Co.
v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714, 51 S.E. 756 (1905); Hodges v. Tomberlin, 170 Ga. App. 842, 319 S.E.2d 11 (1984); Fried
v. Jacobson, 99 il. 2d 24, 457 N.E.2d 392 (1983); Rennier v. State, Through Dept. of Pub. Safety, 428 So. 2d 1261
(La. App. 1983); Smith v. Hubbell, 142 Mich. 637, 106 N.W. 547 (1906); Henry v. Collins, 253 Miss. 34, 158 So. 2d
28 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Hall v. Brookshire, 364 Mo. 774, 267 S.W.2d 627 (1954);
Fenning v. S.G. Holding Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 110, 135 A.2d 346 (1957); Loudin v. Mohawk Airlines, Inc., 27 A.D.2d
517, 275 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1966); Linehan v. Nelson, 197 N.Y. 482, 90 N.E. 1114 (1910); Gudger v. Penland, 108 N.C.
593, 13 S.E. 168 (1891); Bray v. Providence Journal Co., 101 R.I. 111, 220 A.2d 531 (1966); Carey v. Hearst
Publications, 19 Wash. 2d 655, 143 P.2d 857 (1943).
87. ELDREDGE, supra note 3, at 99-100 (footnotes omitted). See Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., 89
N.J. 451, 446 A.2d 469, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
88. See, e.g., McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 892, 220 Cal. Rptr. 848, rereported, 184 Cal. App. 3d
277 (1985), superseded, 42 Cal. 3d 835, 727 P.2d 711,231 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1986); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
17 Cal. 3d 596, 552 P.2d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976) (in dictum, citing cases holding accusations of criminal conduct
do not warrant first amendment protection); Lane v. Arkansas Valley Publishing Co., 675 P.2d 747 (Colo. App. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Palm Beach Newspapers v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1976),cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 354 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (superintendent of schools charged with
cheating or stealing); Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Il. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)
(accusing aldermen of taking bribes); Economy Carpets Mfrs. & Distribs., Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Baton Rouge
Area, Inc., 361 So. 2d 234, 241 (La. App. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979) (in dictum, recognizing that false
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serious nature of these defamatory remarks in Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
Inc. 89 A state trial judge brought a defamation suit against the publishers of a book
that characterized him as "'incompetent,' 'probably corrupt,' and 'suspiciously
lenient.' "9 The charge of incompetence was found to be a constitutionally protected
expression of opinion. However, the other allegations were defamatory statements of
fact.91 These accusations were not imprecise hyperbole used to indicate disagreement
with the plaintiff's decisions. Rather, the court held that a reasonable reader would
interpret the words, in the context of the entire article, to mean that the plaintiff
engaged in illegal and unethical activities. 92 The court explained that statements
imputing a crime are inherently factual when undisclosed facts are implied:
Accusations of criminal activity, even in the form of opinion, are not constitutionally
protected. While inquiry into motivation is within the scope of absolute privilege, outright
charges of illegal conduct, if false, are protected solely by the actual malice test. As noted
by the Supreme Court of California, there is a'critical distinction between opinions which
attribute improper motives to a public officer and accusations, in whatever form, that an
individual has committed a crime or is personally dishonest. No First Amendment protection
enfolds false charges of criminal behavior. 93
Federal courts have also noted that an imputation of a criminal offense warrants
special treatment when considering the fact-opinion dichotomy. 94 Cianci v. New
Times Publishing Company,95 decided by the Second Circuit in 1980, concerned a
magazine article in which a mayor was accused of rape. 96 Judge Friendly held that the
article was not protected as a statement of opinion. 97 The court relied on Greenbelt
and Letter Carriers, which held that accusations of misconduct were not actionable
because the words did not indicate to the ordinary reader that the publication was
insinuations of illegal conduct are actionable); Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Kotlikoff
v. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982) (specific imputation of criminal act based on undisclosed
facts is actionable); Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321 (1982); DiBemardo v.
Tonawanda Publishing, 117 A.D.2d 1009, 499 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1986) (public figure accused of "corruption" and
"bribery"); Marks v. New York News, Inc., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (judge accused of
corruption); Gewurz v. Bernstein, 107 Misc. 2d 857,436 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1981) (attorney accused of champerty); Renwick
v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 304 S.E.2d 593 (1983), rev'd, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405,
reh'g denied, 310 N.C. 749, 315 S.E.2d 704, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v.
Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (bank chairman accused of dishonesty in a fidelity bond claim); Vein Sims
Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 42 Wash. App. 675, 713 P.2d 736, review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1016 (1986).
89. 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
90. Id. at 376-77, 366 N.E.2d at 1303, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
91. Id. at 381-82, 366 N.E.2d at 1306-07, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 950-51.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 382, 366 N.E.2d at 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 951 (citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986); Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Cos., 741 F.2d
193 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985); Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219
(2d Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983); Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227
(6th Cir.),cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Murray v. Bailey, 613 F. Supp. 1276
(N.D. Cal. 1985); Ricci v. Venture Magazine, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Mass. 1983); Cantrell v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. IIl. 1981) (applying Illinois law); McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("homicidal tendencies" attributed to priest).
95. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. Id. at 55-57.
97. Id. at 61.
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accusing the plaintiff of having committed a crime. 98 Conversely, Judge Friendly
concluded that an assertion of criminal activity would be actionable if the reasonable
reader would infer that the plaintiff was being accused of a crime. 99
The Cianci court provided the following guidelines to the criminal conduct
distinction: 1) generally, a pejorative statement of opinion concerning a public figure
is constitutionally safeguarded no matter how vituperous or unreasonable it may be;
2) unqualified constitutional protection is afforded to statements that may refer to
criminal activity when an ordinary person would find the meaning ambiguous in
context; and 3) an allegation of misconduct that could reasonably be understood as
imputing specific criminal conduct is actionable defamation.1°° A charge of illegal
conduct is not protected as pure opinion because criminal accusations are inherently
laden with factual connotations. Therefore, an accusation cast in the form of an
opinion will not protect the defendant from liability. 0t The court reasoned that:
Were such an objection to be sustained to an action for slanderous words, it would be easy
for one who designed to injure the character of another to effect his malicious purpose
without incurring any responsibility. By circulating the slander clothed in expressions of
opinion or belief, he might destroy the fairest reputation with impunity. But the law will not
permit an injury done to character to be without remedy by such artifice as this.02
m. THE FACT-OPINION DocrNEiN m Orio
A. The Common-Law Approach
At common law Ohio courts gave qualified protection 0 3 to comments concern-
ing matters of public interest made by a writer with an honest belief in their truth.1 4
In the majority of jurisdictions, including Ohio, this fair comment privilege required
the statement to be based on true facts, to be free from imputations of corrupt or
dishonorable motives except as warranted by the facts, and to be an honest expression
of the writer's genuine opinion.105 Hence, this defense did not apply to statements of
98. Id. at 65.
99. Id. Note that the allegation in Cianci, like many other cases involving charges of criminal conduct, was based
on misstatements of fact. Id. at 66. To the extent that these accusations are based on false statements of fact or undisclosed
defamatory facts supporting the charge, analysis under the Restatement indicates the comment is unprotected opinion.
R.srAT aSNr (SEcoso) or ToRrs § 566 (1977). See also Note, The Fact-Opinion Dilemma, supra note 52.
100. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 66 (accusation of crime qualified by "I think" not likely to be considered opinion); ELREDGo, supra note
3, at 105-06.
102. Logan v. Steele, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 593 (1809), quoted in ELRDGE, supra note 3, at 106.
103. Publications having a qualified privilege arise out of the circumstances of the publication, and depend upon
publishing in good faith and exercising reasonable diligence to ascertain the truth of the statements. The privilege is
qualified because "the plaintiff may recover, if actual malice be shown, notwithstanding the existence of the
circumstances which would otherwise make the publication a privileged one." Post Publishing Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio
St. 71, 84, 33 N.E. 921, 924 (1893). See also supra note 33.
104. See Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911); Post Publishing Co.
v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 N.E. 921 (1893); Driscoll v. Block, 3 Ohio App. 2d 351, 210 N.E.2d 899 (1965);
McCarthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 101 Ohio App. 297, 136 N.E.2d 393 (1956); Shallenberger v. Scripps Publishing
Co., 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 633, affd, 42 Ohio C.C. 283 (1909), affd, 85 Ohio St. 492, 98 N.E. 1132 (1912).
Although the need for the traditional fair comment defense has become obsolete with respect to public figures and
public officials because of the Sullivan actual malice test (see supra note 27), the doctrine persists in Ohio. See, e.g.,
Greer v. Columbus Monthly Publishing Corp., 4 Ohio App. 3d 235, 240, 448 N.E.2d 157, 163 (1982).
105. See generally id.; supra note 17.
1988]
306 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:293
fact, and therefore required the courts to distinguish between statements of fact and
opinion.106 Although this distinction occasionally turned on a subjective judicial
judgment, 0 7 several guidelines emerged in Ohio. '0 8 A proper inquiry focused on the
ordinary reader's reasonable interpretation of a defamatory statement, given the
common usage or meaning of the defamatory words, the verifiability of the comment,
the context of the statement, and an examination of the circumstances surrounding the
entire publication. 109
The fact-opinion distinction was not applied to material that was slanderous per
se. Thus, imputations of indictable criminal offenses were considered actionable
because the manifestly hurtful statements were facts capable of being proved false. 110
Ohio courts, however, did not specifically address the constitutional mandate to
separate fact from opinion until Milkovich v. News-Herald.111
B. Criminal Conduct Allegations: The Milkovich Precedent
In late 1984 the Ohio Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether an
allegedly defamatory article was an expression of fact or opinion. 112 Milkovich v.
News-Herald 13 concerned a sports column that accused a high school wrestling
106. See Westropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947). "IThe rule that fair comment
on and criticism of the acts and conduct of a public officer or candidate for public office are, in the absence of malice,
privileged, does not apply to a false statement of fact." Id. at 376, 74 N.E.2d at 346. See also supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Foster v. Fesler, 27 Ohio Dec. 127 (1915), aff'd, 37 Ohio C.C. 125 (1916).
108. See McCarthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 101 Ohio App. 297, 136 N.E.2d 393 (1956). See also Cleveland
Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911); Greer v. Columbus Monthly Publishing Corp.,
4 Ohio App. 3d 235, 448 N.E.2d 157 (1982) (reviewing article as a whole).
109. Rudiments of the Oilman totality of circumstances test can be found in McCarthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer. The
case concerned an editorial about the fluoridation of the public water supply. The comments were determined to be
nonactionable opinion. A contextual analysis was applied to the word "misrepresenting," which was found to be subject
to an innocuous connotation. In addition, the statement was not provable because the term was ambiguous. Moreover, the
court specifically considered "the material set forth in the petition as libelous in connection with the entire publication,
keeping in mind the theme of the same, the entire circumstance and that the occasion was one of controversy on a public
question perhaps vitally affecting the public health." Id. at 305, 136 N.E.2d at 399. See also supra notes 52-63 and
accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 N.E 921 (1893); State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St.
30 (1881); Todd v. East Liverpool Publishing Co., 9 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 249, rev'd, 29 Ohio C.C. 155 (1906), aff'd, 81
Ohio St. 521, 91 N.E. 1128 (1909); Kahn v. Cincinnati Times-Star, 8 Ohio N.P. 616 (1890), aff'd, 52 Ohio St. 662, 44
N.E. 1132 (1895); McGuire v. Roth, 8 Ohio Misc. 92, 219 N.E.2d 319 (1965); Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Bishop, 6 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 1113 (1882) (groundless charges of conspiracy actionable because charges were facts rather than legitimate
criticism); Wahle v. Cincinnati Gazette Co., 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 709 (1879) (fair comment defense inapplicable to
charges of larceny). See also supra note 84.
111. 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984).
112. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 298, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (1984) ("[Tmhis court has not
adopted any specific standard with which to guide courts in determining what constitutes an expression of opinion, and
what constitutes an expression of fact.").
113. Milkovich filed a defamation action in the Court of Common Pleas of Lake County against the News.Herald,
its parent company, and the journalist. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the grounds that
Milkovich failed to establish actual malice. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a reasonable jury
could have found that the defendants published the article with actual malice. The Ohio Supreme Court denied the
defendant's motion to certify the record and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the allegedly defamatory statements were opinion. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that Milkovich was a public figure, that the statements were constitutionally protected
opinion, and that the article was published with actual malice. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. Id.
at 292-94, 473 N.E.2d at 1191-93.
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coach, Michael Milkovich, of committing perjury. 1 14 First, the court held that
Milkovich was not a public figure or public official as a matter of law.' 1 5 Next, the
court examined the fact-opinion distinction.'1 6 After addressing several of the tests
used to distinguish between fact and opinion, the court declined to establish a per se
rule in determining what constitutes a protected opinion or a potentially actionable
statement of fact. " 7 The court's somewhat cursory analysis considered the following:
1) whether there were adequate precautions alerting the reader that the column was
an assertion of opinion; and 2) whether the plain import of the author's assertions was
that Milkovich committed the crime of perjury. 1 8 The court concluded that the
statements at issue were factual assertions as a matter of law and were not
constitutionally protected as opinions of the writer.11 9
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the guidelines advocated by Judge Friendly in
Cianci to analyze accusations of criminal conduct: If the statement can reasonably be
understood in context to refer to criminal conduct, and if the statement could
reasonably be interpreted to infer specific criminal acts to the plaintiff, the comment
is inherently factual and is redressable 1 20 Therefore, the Milkovich court afforded the
allegations of criminal conduct only qualified constitutional protection because these
statements are replete with factual connotations. 121 Furthermore, Ohio's highest court
quoted Judge Friendly: "It would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could
escape liability for accusations of crime simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the
words 'I think.'"122 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the common-law
approach advocated by Judge Friendly, which refuses to protect accusations of
criminal conduct cloaked with qualifying language. 123
IV. ScoT v. NEWS-HERALD
A. Facts and Holding
In Scott v. News-Herald, 24 the Ohio Supreme Court abandoned the rationale
used to distinguish fact and opinion in Milkovich.125 Although Scott concerned the
same News-Herald article that was considered in Milkovich, the court effectively
overruled the fact-opinion portion of the case only twenty months after it was
decided.' 26 Both suits involved a column written by sportswriter J. Theodore
114. See infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of the facts surrounding the
Milkovich decision. Both the Mikovich and Scott cases arose from the accusations printed in the same News-Herald article.
115. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 297, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (1984).
116. Id. at 298-99, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-97.
117. Id. at 298, 473 N.E.2d at 1196.
118. Id. at 299, 473 N.E.2d at 1197.
119. Id. at 298-99, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-97.
120. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
121. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 299, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (1984).
122. Id. (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980)).
123. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
124. 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
125. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
126. Justices Andy Douglas and Robert G. Holmes replaced Justices William B. Brown and James P. Celebrezze
in the 1984 election.
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Diadiun that was published in the sports section of the News-Herald in Wil-
loughby, Ohio. 127 The article recounted the circumstances surrounding an interscho-
lastic wrestling match and the subsequent events related to the incident.
In February 1974 Maple Heights High School hosted a wrestling meet against
Mentor High School. When a Maple Heights wrestler was disqualified by the referee,
a fight broke out involving spectators and members of both teams. H. Donald Scott,
then the Superintendent of Maple Heights Public Schools, witnessed the alterca-
tion. 128 Scott and the former head wrestling coach of Maple Heights, Michael
Milkovich, were called to testify before the Ohio High School Athletic Association
(OHSAA). The association placed the entire Maple Heights team on probation, thus
precluding participation in the state tournament, and censured Milkovich for his
actions during the match. 129
Thereafter, wrestlers and parents filed suit against the OHSAA in the Court of
Common Pleas of Franklin County. They contended that the association's hearing
violated due process in imposing sanctions. Both Scott and Milkovich testified at the
proceeding.130 The trial court ruled that the OHSAA had violated due process, and it
reversed the probation and ineligibility orders. 131 The following day Diadiun's
column appeared on the front page of the News-Herald's sports section.' 3 2 The
journalist stated that he had attended the wrestling match and the administrative
hearing, and he purportedly discussed the court trial with the Commissioner of the
OHSAA.13 The article's headline read, "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,'" and
the words "TD Says" were beneath the title. The carryover page was entitled
". .. Diadiun says Maple told a lie."' 134 The report went on to accuse both men of
misrepresenting the events that led to the OHSAA sanctions in an attempt to shift the
blame to the opposing team.1 35 The article stated near the end: "Anyone who
attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or [an] impartial
observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the [due process] hearing
after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.' 136
Both Scott and Milkovich filed separate libel suits, naming the News-Herald and
its parent company, the Lorain County Company, as the defendants. 137 The Scott trial
court dismissed the action on summary judgment. The court held that Scott was a
public official for libel purposes, that the article was constitutionally protected
opinion, and that the plaintiff failed to prove the Sullivan actual malice standard.138
127. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1191 (1984).
128. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 243, 496 N.E.2d 699, 700 (1986).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. See Barrett v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, No. 74 Civ. 09-3390 (Franklin Cty. Jan. 7, 1975).
132. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 277-78, 496 N.E.2d 699, 727-28 (1986).
133. Id. at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701.
134. Id. at 243, 277-78, 496 N.E.2d at 701, 727-28.
135. Id. at 243-44, 496 N.E.2d at 701.
136. Id. at 244, 278, 496 N.E.2d at 701, 728.
137. Id. at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701.
138. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for Lake County affirmed the lower court.' 3 9 Although the
News-Herald prevailed in both defamation cases at trial, different results were
reached by the Ohio Supreme Court. In Milkovich, the state's highest court held that
the article in question was too factually laden to be considered opinion.140 On the
other hand, the same court in Scott reversed itself, ruling that the statements were
opinion deserving of unqualified first amendment protection.141
B. The Scott Opinions
In Scott, Justice Locher, writing for a divided court, explicitly overruled
Milkovich with respect to the application of the fact-opinion doctrine.142 The court
unanimously held that Scott was a public official for purposes of defamation law.' 43
Furthermore, all of the justices agreed that actual malice was not established. 44 Clear
and convincing evidence was not produced which would prove that the defendants
made a false statement with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. 145 Finally,
the court adopted the four-factor totality of circumstances test outlined by Judge Starr
in Olman v. Evans to distinguish fact and opinion.' 46 The Ohio Supreme Court
majority noted that stare decisis did not bind it to the Milkovich precedent because no
test, no analysis, and no rules were articulated to support the majority opinion. 147
Hence, the court claimed that it was justified in the present determination that
Diadiun's article was constitutionally protected opinion. 148
Scott v. News-Herald engendered seven different opinions. Justices Holmes,
Douglas, and Wright concurred with Justice Locher's opinion. Justice Holmes merely
noted that stare decisis was not violated, stating that a decision which is "clearly
wrong" should be overruled because there is "no valid public purpose to allow
incorrect opinions to remain in the body of our law." 149 Justice Douglas agreed that
the statements in question were clearly opinion.' 50 Justice Wright agreed with the
adoption of the totality of circumstances test, but he went on to advocate a
"bright-line" rule to eliminate the uncertainty of characterizing statements as fact or
opinion.'15 This approach would afford complete constitutional protection to articles
139. Id. See Scott v. News-Herald, No. 9-128, slip. op. ( Lake Cty. Dec. 30, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio
file), aff'd, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
140. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 299, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196-97 (1984).
141. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 244, 254, 496 N.E.2d 699, 701, 709 (1986).
142. Id. at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701.
143. Id. at 248, 496 N.E.2d at 704.
144. Id. at 249, 496 N.E.2d at 705. See also id. at 263, 496 N.E.2d at 716 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in
judgment only); id. at 266, 496 N.E.2d at 718 (Sweeney, J., concurring injudgment only); id. at 270, 496 N.E.2d at 721
(Brown, J., concurring in part).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 706 (citing Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986)).
147. Id. at 249, 496 N.E.2d at 705.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709 (Holmes, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 255, 496 N.E.2d at 709 (Douglas, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 262, 496 N.E.2d at 715 (Wright, J., concurring).
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specifically labeled "opinion"; statements made without the opinion label, not
located in the editorial section, would be given only limited protection. 152
Chief Justice Celebrezze and Justice Sweeney concurred in the judgment only.
Both men agreed with the majority's conclusion that Scott was a public official and
that he failed to establish actual malice.' 5 3 However, neither justice agreed that
Milkovich should have been overruled on the fact-opinion issue, and they criticized
the majority for adopting the totality of circumstances test.' 54 Chief Justice
Celebrezze characterized the test as an "amorphous" and "unworkable" analysis
that is "used to complete the Jekyll and Hyde transformation of this newspaper article
from fact to opinion."'' 55 He noted that criminal accusations, even if expressed as
opinion, are not afforded absolute first amendment protection.15 6 Similarly, Justice
Sweeney noted that the test "can be juxtaposed to forge any interpretation that the
user of the 'test' desires." 157 He advocated using the Cianci court rationale, which
gives special consideration to allegations of criminal conduct similar to the common-
law doctrine of slander per se.158
Justice Clifford F. Brown agreed with the public figure and actual malice
determinations. 159 However, in a scathing opinion, he claimed that "any reader of
today's majority opinion can readily see the real rule adopted by the majority: in a
libel case, the newspaper always wins. '16° He characterized the majority's "con-
cems and/or tests" as "no more than a geyser spouting judicial steam, fog, and
mist.' 161 Justice Brown claimed that Milkovich set forth a workable test to
distinguish fact from opinion. 162 Because Diadiun's article ascribed criminal conduct
to Scott, it warranted analysis under the Cianci rationale that was outlined in
Milkovich.163 The Ollman test was inapplicable. However, he maintained that
Diadiun's article would constitute a statement of fact even when the "vapid,
meaningless, so-called four-factor test" was properly employed. 164 Justice Brown
also charged that the majority rushed "hell-bent" to overrule Milkovich "[i]n order
to curry favor with the media at large in an election year.' ' 65 In conclusion, he
castigated "the verbal orgy of nonsensical jargon which cascades from the majority's
discussion of the spurious four-factor test" because it would make "every statement
of fact a statement of opinion in every case and therefore not actionable." '166
152. Id. at 261-63, 496 N.E.2d at 714-16 (Wright, J., concurring). See also Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction,
supra note 47.
153. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243,263,266,496 N.E.2d 699, 716,718 (1986) (Celebrezze, C.J., and
Sweeney, J., concurring in judgment only, dissenting in part).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 263, 496 N.E.2d at 716 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting in part).
156. Id. at 265, 496 N.E.2d at 717 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 267, 496 N.E.2d at 719 (Sweeney, J., dissenting in part).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 269-70, 496 N.E.2d at 721 (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
160. Id. at 271 n.10, 496 N.E.2d at 721 n.10 (Brown, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 273, 496 N.E.2d at 723 (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 270, 496 N.E.2d at 721 (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
163. Id. See also supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
164. Id. at 275, 496 N.E.2d at 725 (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 276, 496 N.E.2d at 725 (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
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V. PROPER ANALYSIS OF THE FACr-OPINION DICHOTOMY IN SCOT
A. The Totality of Circumstances Test
1. The Precision Prong
Justice Locher began the fact-opinion analysis in Scott v. News-Herald by
recognizing the various standards used to separate fact from opinion. 167 The majority
chose to adopt the totality of circumstances test that was outlined by Judge Starr of
the D.C. Circuit in Ollman v. Evans.' 68 First, the Ohio Supreme Court examined the
common usage or meaning behind the specific language of the allegedly defamatory
statement.169 A statement that is indefinite and ambiguous is not actionable; however,
if a reasonable reader would understand the statement as having a precise meaning,
it would only deserve qualified constitutional protection. 170 Although the word
"perjury" was not used, Justice Locher correctly concluded that the plain import of
Diadiun's article was that Scott lied in court after he had sworn to tell the truth. 171
Thus, the consensus of understanding would be that the article charged Scott with an
indictable crime. The court concluded that Scott would have a valid cause of action
if no further inquiry were made.172
When Judge Starr explained the considerations behind the first prong of the
totality of circumstances test, he gave two examples of statements at opposite ends of
the fact-opinion dichotomy.173 At the opinion end of the spectrum was the term
"fascist." He characterized the term as opinion because it does not have a precise
definition or a distinct meaning, and it is often used in heated political debate.' 74 At
the factual end of the spectrum was an accusation of criminal conduct. Judge Starr
concluded that a reasonable reader would interpret imputations of illegal activity to
imply severely damaging facts.175
Courts have agreed that accusing a person of lying while under oath constitutes
a factual assertion 176 partly because an imputation of perjury has a precise
definition.' 77 Since this accusation of criminal conduct has a distinct meaning, the
ordinary reader of the News-Herald column would assume that the journalist,
167. Id. at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 705-06.
168. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
169. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250-51, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706-07 (1986).
170. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302, 1303-04 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272
(1986); Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
171. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 251, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986).
172. Id.
173. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U S. 1127 (1985).
174. Id. at 980-81 (citing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 895 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977)).
175. Id. at 980 (citing Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 1980) and Rinaldi v. Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 369, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977)).
176. See, e.g., Di Lorenzo v. New York News, 81 A.D.2d 844, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1981). See also supra note 86.
177. Perjury by a witness is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). See also Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.
3d 243,251,496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986) (holding an accusation of lying under oath implied perjury, a precisely defined
criminal offense); BLAc0's LAw Dicno.zAY 1025 (5th ed. 1979) (defining the term "'pejury" as "a crime committed when
a lawful oath is administered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person who swears, wilfully, absolutely, and falsely, in
a matter material to the issue or point in question.").
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Theodore Diadiun, based his statements on unstated facts which indicated that Scott
lied under oath. However, the journalist failed to disclose any lie that Scott told while
he was under oath. If the average reader would infer that the writer had an
undisclosed factual basis for the statement, the reader "does not have the tools
necessary to independently evaluate the opinion and may rely on unfounded opinion
that defames an individual." 7 8
2. The Verifiability Prong
The second part of the totality of circumstances test also supports the conclusion
that the News-Herald article was factual.179 This guideline concerns whether the
statement is objectively verifiable. A reasonable reader will believe that a statement
is opinion if it has no plausible method of verification. 80 The Scott court held that the
allegation of perjury could be proven or disproven with evidence adduced from
transcripts and witnesses present at the hearing.' 8 ' In contrast to a subjective
comment that cannot be characterized as true or false, the allegedly defamatory
remarks were an articulation of an objectively verifiable action. Hence, Justice
Locher logically concluded that both the first and second factors of the Olman test
indicated that the accusations made in Diadiun's column were factual. 182
3. The Context Prong
Under the third prong of the totality of circumstances test, a court should
consider the complete literary context of the statement to determine whether the
language surrounding the statement would cause the average reader to infer that the
specific language used was opinion. 183 First, Justice Locher noted that the article's
byline and the caption "TD Says" indicated to the average reader that the column
was opinion.'8 4 Although these words attribute the contents of the column to Diadiun,
the presence of the writer's name does not effectively caution a reasonable reader that
only statements of opinion follow. 85 Certainly, the journalist reported some facts in
his article. Nevertheless, Justice Locher asserted that the caption attributing the
article to Diadiun "would indicate to even the most gullible reader that the article
was, in fact, opinion."' 186 This notion is contradicted by two members of the Ohio
178. Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Cos., 741 F.2d 193, 195-96 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1190 (1985) (no undisclosed facts existed necessary for viewer to make an independent evaluation), cited in Scott v. News
Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986). See also Kelly v. Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1986) (since charge made against plaintiffs was not accompanied by an explanation, no signal was given to reader that
statement was opinion). Thus, under the Restatement analysis, Diadiun's article would be considered fact because the
allegation of perjury was based on undisclosed defamatory facts. See supra note 51.
179. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 251-52, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986).
180. See lanklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302, 1304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986);
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 981-82 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
181. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 252, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986).
182. Id. at 250-52, 496 N.E.2d at 706-07 (holding that the statement was beth clearly defined and verifiable).
183. See Janidow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302-03, 1304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272
(1986); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
184. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 252, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986).
185. Id. at 264, 272-73, 496 N.E.2d at 716, 723 (Celebrezze, C.J., and Brown, J., dissenting in part).
186. Id. at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
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Supreme Court who found that the existence of the writer's name "merely identifies
the author of the factual assertion which follows."1 87 Moreover, the Milkovich court
noted that nothing in the same article cautioned the recipients that the statements were
opinion.18 8 The divergent viewpoints expressed by the court evidence that a
reasonable reader could easily interpret the column to contain factual assertions.
Next, Justice Locher examined the cautionary language surrounding the alleg-
edly libelous statements. 18 9 He noted that the article did not use any qualifying
phrases such as "I think" or "in my opinion," which might put the average reader
on notice that the article was opinion.19° Furthermore, the court recognized Judge
Friendly's observation that a writer should not be able to escape liability in a
defamation suit simply by prefacing a libelous statement with the words "I think." 191
The majority reasoned, however, that the article's major premise concerned the need
for people in positions of authority to be completely honest when their actions are
called into question; therefore, this concept was the subjective basis for writing the
article. Because the report that Milkovich and Scott lied under oath was not the major
issue when read in context, Justice Locher concluded that the accusation was more
inclined to be construed as opinion. 192
Although the allegedly defamatory statement may not have been the major
premise of the column, a newspaper cannot escape liability for the simple reason that
a libelous statement was made to support the article's major thesis. The totality of
circumstances test has never mandated this analysis. The subjective conclusions of an
article should not transform otherwise factual assertions into opinion. It would be
unreasonable to insulate a writer for reporting defamatory statements of fact so long
as they merely support a conclusion. Diadiun questioned the lesson that young people
might learn from high school administrators and coaches who lied under oath. 193 This
conclusion, however, was based on the events surrounding the wrestling match and
the accusation of peijury. 194 Thus, the writer was delivering factual reports to his
187. Id. at 264,272-73,496 N.E.2d at 716,723 (Brown, J., dissenting in part). Similarly, Chief Justice Celebrezze
also believed that the author's name served only to identify the journalist: "[Mhe purpose of a caption is to identify the
writer." Id. at 264, 496 N.E.2d at 716 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting in part).
188. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 299, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (1984).
189. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 252, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986).
190. Id.
191. Id. Accord Converters Equip. Corp. v. Condes Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 257, 258 N.W.2d 712 (1977). But see Alfego
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1075 (D. Mass. 1981); Loeb v. New Times Communications
Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
192. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 252-53, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707-08 (1986).
193. Id. at 277-78, 496 N.E.2d at 727-28.
194. Another statement of fact was a purported quote attributed to a witness to the legal proceedings, which was used
by Diadiun to support his allegation of perjury. Dr. Harold Meyer, a commissioner of the Ohio High School Athletic
Association, was quoted as saying, "I can say that some of the stories told to the judge sounded pretty darned
unfamiliar. . . . It certainly sounded different from what they told us." Id. at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708. Justice Locher
recognized two problems with this "troubling addition to the article." Id. at 252-53, 496 N.E.2d at 708. First, evidence
indicated that the statement was never made. Second, the nature of the due process hearing made it highly unlikely that
Scott even had the opportunity to lie about questions relating to specific prior actions. Id. at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
Therefore, the charge was not only based on unrevealed facts (the perjured remarks made in court), but also it was based
on a disclosed fact that was presumably false. The court impliedly recognized that this statement only lent credence to the
conclusion that the defamatory statement was fact. See id. See also R msAa'IEwr (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 571 (1977), which
provides that, "[o]ne who publishes a slander that imputes to another conduct constituting a criminal offense is subject
to liability to the other without proof of special harm .... " The publication of the quote that alleged criminal
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reader that supported the major premise rather than preparing the reader for an
opinion. 195
The court concluded its literary analysis by contending that a contextual reading
would reveal the biased nature of the article. 196 Hence, an ordinary reader would
construe the imputation of perjury as opinion because the column was not impartial.
Justice Locher's conclusion centers around the statement that, "Anyone who
attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer,
knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given
his solemn oath to tell the truth. ' 197 Apparently, the majority believed that the
phrase, "knows in his heart," indicated that the question of perjury was actually a
subjective determination.
Although the phrase may be an attempt at colorful writing, 198 the court's
reasoning ignores Diadiun's efforts to qualify his biased viewpoint. The reporter
attempted to make his accusation of criminal conduct more objective, noting that an
"impartial observer" would support his conclusion that Scott committed perjury. 199
Moreover, a witness' purported quotation based upon his observations buttressed the
column's credibility through this presentation of objective fact.2°° In addition,
Diadiun stated that he had attended both the wrestling match and the administrative
hearing, 201 so he was in a logical position to determine whether Scott lied under oath.
Hence, the article cannot be characterized as so replete with bias that an ordinary
reader would understand the accusation to be an opinion not meant to be interpreted
as a factual representation.
Even if the third prong of the totality of circumstances test indicated that the
perjury allegation had characteristics of an opinion, the literary analysis should not be
given conclusive weight. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the first and
second guidelines indicated that the allegedly libelous statement was clearly defined
and verifiable. 20 2 The Scott court concluded, however, that the literary context
favored a determination of opinion.20 3 But when a statement is as factually laden as
an accusation of criminal conduct, qualifying language, biased tone, and vehement
misconduct would be defamatory in itself under this rationale. Compare Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal.
3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986),cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987) (quote qualified with language of
apparency indicating hypothetical nature of comment not actionable) with Selleck v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d
1123,212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1985) (Article did "not merely express defendant's opinion that plaintiff made statements about
his son. Rather, [it] assert[s] as a fact that plaintiff made the statements.").
195. See generally Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1130 (7th Cir. 1987).
196. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 253, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708 (1986).
197. Id. (emphasis in original).
198. See Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981) (statement
made at public meeting-municipal garbage contract awarded after "two hundred forty pieces of silver changed
hands . . . thirty for each alderman"-constituted charge of bribery).
199. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 278, 496 N.E.2d 699, 728 (1986).
200. Id. at 264-65, 496 N.E.2d at 717 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 278; 496 N.E.2d at 728 ("I was among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet at which the trouble broke
out, and I also attended the hearing before the OHSAA, so I was in the unique position of being the only non-involved
party to observe both the meet itself and the Milkovich-Scott version presented to the board.").
202. Id. at 250-52, 496 N.E.2d at 706-07.
203. Id. at 252-53, 496 N.E.2d at 707-08.
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and caustic phrases are "essentially unavailable to dilute the factual implications." 204
As Judge Starr explained in Olman, the immediate verbal context should be "given
relatively little weight on the opinion side of the scale" if an allegation of criminal
conduct is clearly defined and verifiable. 20 5 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court not only
misapplied the literary context considerations, but also overemphasized their impor-
tance when balancing the totality of circumstances.
4. The Setting Prong
Finally, Justice Locher analyzed the fourth branch of the totality of circum-
stances test.206 This guideline examines the broader public context or setting in which
the specific language appears. 207 The majority opinion inquired into the type of article
and whether its placement in the newspaper would influence the ordinary reader's
interpretation of the fact-opinion distinction. 208 The court began by noting that the
article appeared on the sports page under the byline "By Ted Diadiun, News-Herald
Sports Writer." 20 9 In conclusion, Justice Locher claimed that "a reader would not
expect a sports writer on the sports page to be particularly knowledgeable about
procedural due process and perjury. It is our belief that 'legal conclusions' in such a
context would probably be construed as the writer's opinion.''210
The majority's analysis creates "a veritable per se rule ... whereby anything
defamatory that appears in the sports pages is automatically non-actionable." 21 1 Even
statements made in the editorial page or op-ed section, however, cannot be
completely protected by the first amendment all of the time. No court has ever made
a per se rule insulating all statements made on the editorial page. This prophylactic
rule would become a license for libel in situations in which there is an allegation of
criminal conduct. Because opinions are usually based on statements of fact, Judge
Starr refused to construe all editorial remarks as statements of constitutionally
protected opinion. 21 2 This same reasoning would be even more applicable to the
sports section, which is founded more on factual reporting than on issues of public
debate.
204. Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1502 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)).
205. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 985-86 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) (citing
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980) (statement falsely accusing a public official of rape and
obstruction of justice found libelous)).
206. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 253-54, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708-09 (1986).
207. See Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1303, 1304-05 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986);
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983-85 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
208. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 253-54, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708-09 (1986).
209. Id. at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
210. Id. at 253-54, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
211. Id. at 267, 496 N.E.2d at 719 (Sweeney, J., concurring in judgment only, and dissenting in part).
212. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 987 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). Judge Starr
wrote:
Of course, we do not hold that any statement on an editorial or Op-Ed page is constitutionally privileged
opinion. While such a rule would have the advantage of simplicity and clarity, it could too readily become a
license to libel. Even when situated on the editorial page the statement "Mr. Jones had ten drinks at his office
party and sideswiped two vehicles on his way home" would obviously be construed as a factual statement.
Id. (citation omitted).
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The court misapplied the totality of circumstances test again. As Judge Starr
explained in Ollman, factual determination is favored when the person reporting the
facts is generally considered likely to be in a position to report facts. 213 Diadiun
covered the story from its inception. He attended the administrative hearing at which
Milkovich and Scott first testified. Furthermore, a reasonable person would assume
from the witness' statement that Diadiun interviewed at least one person who attended
the judicial hearing. 214 In addition, the article appeared in the News-Herald on the
day after the trial court's decision.2 15 Thus, an ordinary person would consider the
journalist to be in an excellent position to give a factual account of the events.
Placement on the sports page should not affect the merit of the article, and it should
not definitively militate in favor of treating the statement as opinion.
B. The Public, Political Arena Considerations
When analyzing the fact-opinion dichotomy, a number of courts give special
consideration to the first amendment principles implicated by statements that are
made in a political or public forum.216 A statement that involves criticism of the
motives and intentions of a public official implicates core values of the first
amendment. Hence, an ordinary reader is more likely to construe a comment
concerning a public person's public conduct as an opinion than as a statement of
fact.2 17 Public context considerations, however, cannot be given determinative
weight in the totality of circumstances test because criminal accusations against
public figures are particularly susceptible to factual interpretation. 218
The public context considerations were not adequately addressed by the Scott
court. Justice Locher merely noted that the issue was of public importance. 219
However, other courts have recently determined that specific accusations of criminal
conduct are factual even in important and controversial areas of public interest such
as theological debate, the tobacco industry, and politics. 220 Diadiun's article may
have been part of an ongoing public debate that was replete with political
considerations, but this context should only put the reader on notice that an accusation
213. Id. at 985 n.31.
214. See Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 278, 496 N.E.2d 699, 728 (1986).
215. Id. at 243, 496 N.E.2d at 700-01.
216. See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986); Saenz v.
Playboy Enters., 653 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. 111. 1987); Populist Party of Iowa v. American Black Hawk Broadcasting Co.,
14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1217 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1987); Capan v. Daugherty, 402 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
See also Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
217. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
218. See Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986).
219. See Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 254, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708-09 (1986). Justice Locher hastily
dismissed first amendment considerations of the public, political arena in one phrase: "Mhe issues involved are of
importance to the community and the vehicle for dissemination of the ideas is opinion." Id.
220. See Kelly v. Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986) (accusation of illegal conduct may be construed as fact
even in context of highly charged and opinion-ridden theological debate); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987) (charge construed as fact in context of tobacco industry debate); Brasher v. Carr,
No. C14-86-753-CV, slip op. (rex. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Texas file) (accusations of
corruption in office considered factual in context of political debate).
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may be used as protected rhetorical hyperbole. In other words, the political context
of a statement may be one of "public debate, heated labor dispute, or other
circumstances in which an 'audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade
others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole .... ,2
For example, no reasonable reader or court would understand as factual the
following specific criminal allegations when read in their respective social, political
contexts: 1) an abortionist activist being accused of "murder"; 2 2 2) a developer
charged with "raping" the land or asserting a negotiating position tantamount to
"blackmail"; 223 or 3) a nonunion worker called a "traitor to his country. ' 2 2 4 When
examined in the public, political arena, these situations are clearly distinguishable
from cases in which the ordinary reader is given the impression that the individual has
actually committed a crime. By falling to recognize the difference between rhetorical
hyperbole in the public, political arena and a serious imputation of illegal activity, the
Scott court unjustly subordinated the individual's reputational interest to the first
amendment interests of the media.
C. The Criminal Conduct Distinction
A number of courts do not undertake an extensive analysis under the totality of
circumstances test when the allegedly libelous statement could reasonably be
understood as implying specific criminal acts.22- As Judge Friendly noted in Cianci,
"a pejorative statement of opinion concerning a public figure generally is constitu-
tionally protected" unless the charge "could reasonably be understood as imputing
specific criminal ... acts.''226 These jurisdictions often rely on the proposition
outlined in Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. that criminal accusations, even
if opinion, are not entitled to unqualified constitutional protection. 227 This distinc-
tion, which is rooted in the common-law doctrine of slander per se, recognizes the
inherently factual nature of criminal conduct charges. 228
Chief Justice Celebrezze recognized the Scott majority's failure to employ Judge
Friendly's guidelines that were adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Milkovich.22 9
Justice Locher noted that the criminal conduct distinction was not useful in
determining whether the statement was fact or opinion because it was merely a
"subjective judgment call."230 Closer examination reveals, however, that the Cianci
guidelines incorporate the rationale of the totality of circumstances test.
221. Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 601, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644, 552 P.2d 425, 428 (1976)).
222. See Baird v. Roussin, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1555 (D. Mass. 1980).
223. See Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
224. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
225. See supra notes 88, 94.
226. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
227. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 383, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943,
951, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). See also supra notes 88 and 94.
228. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
229. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 265,496 N.E.2d 699, 717 (1986) (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting in
part).
230. Id. at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 706.
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
First, the criminal conduct distinction requires that the charge be specific.2 3 1
This requirement parallels the first prong of the Olman four-factor test.2 32 The
second prong of the totality of circumstances test-verifiability-is not mentioned.
This factor should be presumed because all specific charges of criminal conduct are
verifiable in a court of law.233 Next, the Cianci guidelines suggest that expressions
of opinion containing charges of criminal conduct are not afforded unqualified
constitutional protection. 234 This is the same proposition mandated by the third prong
of the Olman test: accusations of illegal activity are so factually laden that indications
of opinion in the literary context-qualifying language ("I think"), the format
containing the statement, colorful or caustic writing, or a biased tone-should be
unavailable to protect the writer from liability.2 35 Finally, the Cianci guidelines
incorporate the broader social context of the statement, which is the fourth factor of
the Olman test.236 The statement is actionable only if the ordinary reader would
understand the writer to be imputing criminal activity. 237 Thus, charges understood
as extravagant exaggeration made in the public, political arena are completely
protected.
Clearly, the Scott court should not have abandoned the Cianci guidelines that it
adopted in Milkovich under the exact same factual situation. Closer examination of
the criminal conduct distinction in light of the totality of circumstances test is the best
method to employ when analyzing allegations of criminal conduct. Giving a
presumption of fact to specific charges understood as accusations of illegal behavior
merely recognizes that these statements are too factually laden to be considered
opinion.
VI. ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT: BALANCING THE TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES
Authorities unanimously agree that the distinction between fact and opinion is
rarely self-evident or exact. 238 Accusations of criminal conduct are a notorious source
of confusion. Judge Friendly noted that allegations of criminal behavior are nearly
always opinion. 239 On the other hand, Judge Starr uses well-defined assertions of
criminal activity as an example of factual statements. 240 Nevertheless, both jurists
agree that allegations of criminal conduct warrant special attention in defamation
actions. The confusion surrounding the fact-opinion dichotomy can be alleviated if
the factors of the totality of circumstances are properly balanced. Furthermore, when
231. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1980).
232. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
234. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1980).
235. See supra notes 183-205 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
237. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1980).
238. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,978 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) ("While
courts are divided in their methods of distinguishing between assertions of fact and expressions of opinion, they are
universally agreed that the task is a difficult one.").
239. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
240. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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accusations of criminal conduct are given this special consideration, neither the
person's reputational interest nor the media's first amendment interest will be
unjustifiably subordinated.
When a public figure or public official is accused of criminal conduct, the court
first must examine the statement's specificity. Charges that are "broad brush-stroked
references to unethical conduct," such as participation in a "scam," a "rip-off,"
"cheating," or a "con game," are too ambiguous to be considered direct charges of
illegal conduct. 241 Thus, many criminal conduct defamation actions will not survive
scrutiny under this analysis. 242 However, unequivocal accusations of criminal
conduct are obviously laden with factual content. 243 Therefore, the first prong of the
totality of circumstances test should be given tremendous weight.
Extensive analysis of criminal accusations under the verifiability prong of the
Oilman test is not useful. As the Fourth Circuit recently noted, "verifiability is
ultimately relevant only insofar as it preserves the truth defense and protects
statements which the ordinary reader or listener would recognize as incapable of
positive proof. "244 Because all allegations of illegal behavior are capable of objective
verification in a court of law, the question is moot. Nevertheless, this factor provides
another indication that criminal charges are filled with factual connotations.
The literary context deserves minimal weight when balancing the totality of
circumstances surrounding an accusation of illegal activity. Linguistic devices such
as cautionary language, biased tone, and caustic or colorful phrases should be
unavailable to diminish the factual implications. Moreover, the form of publication-
report, column, commentary, editorial, letter-to-the-editor 245-- or its location in the
publication are essentially ineffective at diminishing the factual content of criminal
allegations.
Finally, the courts must consider the broad social, public, and political context
of the charge. This consideration must be analyzed in light of the following question:
Would the ordinary reader believe that the plaintiff is being accused of a crime? If the
statement is obviously an extravagant exaggeration made for effect in the broad
public context, the accusation is rhetorical hyperbole and should not be actionable.
But if the "ordinary and average reader would likely understand the use of these
241. See Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Cos., 741 F.2d 193, 197 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1190 (1985) (citing Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974);
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
242. Accusations should constitute specific charges of criminal offenses if the statement bears a reasonably close
resemblance to the legislative definition of a crime. See, e.g., Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App.
548, 372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978). Offenses involving moral turpitude should be encompassed by the analysis within this Case
Comment. See, e.g., Berkson v. Time, Inc., 8 A.D.2d 352, 187 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1959), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 1007, 166
N.E.2d 847, 200 N.Y.S.2d SI (1960).
243. See Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1501 (D.D.C. 1987). ("To the average reader or
listener, unequivocal statements . . . about deliberate wrongdoing are obviously laden with factual content.")
244. Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1289 (4th Cir. 1987). The case further
held that the verifiability prong of the Ollman test is "a minimum threshold issue. If the defendant's words cannot be
decribed as either true or false, they are not actionable, even if they are cautiously phrased and published in a learned
treatise." Id. at 1288.
245. See DiBemardo v. Tonawanda Publishing,117 A.D.2d 1009, 499 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1986) (anonymous letter to
the editor accusing public figure of "corruption" and "bribery" capable of being defamatory fact).
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words, in the context of the entire article, as meaning that [the] plaintiff committed
illegal and unethical actions," the statement must be considered fact.246
Balancing the four prongs of the totality of circumstances test as outlined above
will clarify the distinction between criminal accusations of fact and opinion.
Moreover, the outcome of the test will be more predictable. Application of this
presumption of fact to specific charges of criminal conduct, which can only be
overcome by a common understanding of rhetorical hyperbole in the broad social and
political context, will protect the public figure's reputational interest. On the other
hand, freedom of the press is protected. For example, in Scott, the Sullivan actual
malice test provided qualified protection to the News-Herald. Because Scott, a public
figure, failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct was made with false and reckless disregard,
every member of the Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the statement was safe-
guarded. 247 Thus, the media's first amendment interest is effectively sheltered by the
Sullivan actual malice and falsity tests. 248
VII. CONCLUSION
Defamation decisions searching for the elusive distinction between fact and
opinion have promulgated a variety of tests that have been manipulated to reach
inconsistent conclusions. These courts have had particular difficulty drawing the first
amendment line between fact and opinion when the factors of the totality of
circumstances test indicate that the statement has characteristics of both fact and
opinion. 249 As Judge Bowman noted in Janklow:
[I]t would appear that the result to be obtained through application of the Oilman factors is
in the eye of the judge. Clearly those factors do not yield predictability, unless the prediction
is that their application almost always will result in keeping defamation actions brought by
public officials and public figures from reaching a jury.
What is called for.., in cases raising the fact/opinion issue, is a thoughtful balancing
of the competing interests, not the nearly total subordination of the individual's reputational
interest to the media's desire for immunity from accountability to individuals harmed by
defamatory material published with actual malice.2so
246. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 382, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943,
951, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). See also Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280
(4th Cir. 1987). A statement "qualifies as an 'opinion' if it is clear from any of the ...Oilman factors, individually
or in conjunction, that a reasonable reader or listener would recognize its weakly substantiated or subjective character-
and discount it accordingly." Id. at 1288 (emphasis in original). Analysis of criminal conduct accusations must take into
account, however, the inherently factual nature of these statements. Balancing the prongs of the Oilman test as outlined
above will allow for the increased likelihood that an ordinary reader will interpret specific charges of illegal activity as
statements of fact.
247. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 248-49, 496 N.E.2d 699, 705 (1986).
248. See supra note 29. See also Note, Structuring Defamation Law, supra note 28.
249. See Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1288 (4th Cir. 1987). ("[Ihe
Ollman test and other tests like it leave considerable doubt as to the proper outcome when all of these factors are not in
agreement.")
250. Janklowv. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1307, 1308 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 272 (1986).
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The Ohio Supreme Court has served as a significant source of defective and
discordant opinions in the defamation context. In Milkovich v. News-Herald, the
court adopted the rationale behind the Cianci criminal conduct distinction. 25' Less
than two years later and after the addition of two new justices, the court abandoned
this rationale in favor of the Ollman totality of circumstances test.25 2 Under the new
analysis, the allegedly defamatory statements made in the newspaper were trans-
formed from fact into fully protected opinion. However, both tests involve the same
considerations, and proper application of either rationale should have led to one
conclusion in Milkovich v. News-Herald and Scott v. News-Herald: The allegation of
perjury was an actionable fact that only deserved qualified first amendment
protection. 253
Although comments regarding the motivations and intentions of public officials
should be encouraged, false imputations of criminal activity are manifestly damaging
statements undeserving of unqualified first amendment protection. 254 Even though a
public figure may be less vulnerable to injury from defamation and less deserving of
recovery than a private person,2 5 a public figure or public official has "no less
interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life. ' 256 Therefore,
when considering charges of illegal activity pursuant to the totality of circumstances
test, a person's interests in maintaining his reputation and living unhindered in his
public and private pursuits must not be hastily subordinated to the freedoms of speech
and press. Thus, if an assertion of criminal conduct is both clearly defined and
verifiable under the first and second factors of the totality of circumstances test, and
an ordinary reader would not construe the accusation to be an extravagant exagger-
ation, the statement should be presumptively considered fact and should receive only
qualified constitutional protection. Application of the Olman totality of circum-
stances test in this manner will strike a proper balance between media interests and
individual interests while infusing an element of predictability into cases addressing
the fact-opinion dichotomy.
John Todd Arkebauer
251. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 299, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (1984).
252. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986). See also supra notes 142-66
and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 167-248 and accompanying text.
254. See generally Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1309 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 272 (1986).
255. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Justice Brennan noted that private persons are "more
vulnerable to injury" because they lack "access to the channels of effective communication . . . to counteract false
statements." Moreover, private persons are "more deserving of recovery" because "they have relinquished no part of
[their] interest in the protection of [their] good name[s]" by "thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of issues involved." Id. at 344-45.
256. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971). Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, also
noted that, "'While the argument that public figures need less protection because they command media attention to counter
criticism may be true for some very prominent people, even then it is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original
charge." Id. See also Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180, 4181 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988) (No. 86-1278);
Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1307-08 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986).
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